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Abstract
When one has such learned predecessors, representing the two powerful institutions, who
give such a balanced view of the Treaty of Amsterdam (or “Amsterdam Treaty”), what more can
a simple parliamentarian say? I think my first comment would be, Amsterdam–yes, the worst has
been avoided. I think that this comment is an honest compliment to the efforts of my predecessors
during the Intergovernmental Conference (“IGC”). The outcome could have been much worse.
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When one has such learned predecessors, representing the
two powerful institutions, who give such a balanced view of the
Treaty of Amsterdam1 (or "Amsterdam Treaty"), what more can
a simple parliamentarian say? I think my first comment would
be, Amsterdam-yes, the worst has been avoided. I think that
this comment is an honest compliment to the efforts of my pred-
ecessors during the Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC").
The outcome could have been much worse.
My first point is that the whole climate of the three-year
preparation for Amsterdam was, both politically and economi-
cally, a very negative one. Politically, several governments were
undergoing "Euroskeptic" phases: the United Kingdom was split
not only up the middle over Europe, but also horizontally; the
German government was increasingly concerned about giving
up the Deutschmark; and the French government was divided
into a majority who wanted to go back to intergovernmentalism
and a minority who wanted to go further. But, above all, we had
an economic climate with increasing unemployment and a situa-
tion in which many citizens-I refer here to the Danish and
French referendums-demonstrated that the European Union
was not really close to their hearts.
Against this background, it is really quite remarkable that
we could agree on anything at all. My first compliment, there-
fore, would be to the negotiators who managed to keep the Eu-
ropean Union as an ongoing concern. The European Union
has not only survived, but also, in certain respects, been strength-
ened.
* Member of the European Parliament; former Director-General, Directorate Gen-
eral XI Environment and Consumer Protection.
1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
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The job called for in the Maastricht Treaty2 (or "Treaty on
European Union"), was to develop the European Union on the
basis of the acquis communautaire.3 During the IGC, there existed
a serious risk that elements would be added that might perhaps
undo the original acquis communautaire. Fortunately, this risk has
been avoided. For example, the vital right of initiative of the
Commission with regard to the common policies has been safe-
guarded and, as we will see, has even been extended to the
whole police and justice cooperation under the "third pillar."4
The role of the Court of Justice-on which I will not further
dwell because who better than former Court of Justice President
Ole Due to defend it-has been further developed and earlier
attacks have been thwarted. So from that point of view, Amster-
dam cannot be faulted.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the Treaty
of Amsterdam contains no Preamble. It is the first time that the
Treaties were revised without a reassertion of the political vision
in a Preamble. This demonstrates the very pragmatic nature of
the operation. If some participants had insisted on a new Pre-
amble to the Treaty, like that in the Single European Act5 or in
the Treaty on European Union,6 there probably would not have
been any agreement. The bottom line is that the Treaty of Am-
2. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]).
3. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FoRDHLAM INT'L L.J. 1092, 1140-57 (1995).
Professor Goebel analyzes the evolution of the acquis communautaire concept since the
first enlargement. He notes that: "This term, [acquis communautaire,] so hard to trans-
late that the French is invariably used even in English texts, means essentially that the
intrinsic core of the Community (now the "Union") legal and political structure is a
given ("acquis") which the new Member State must accept, not challenge or call into
question." Id. at 1141; see C. Curti Gialdino, Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,
32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1089 (1995).
4. Title VI of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Provisions on cooperation
in the fields ofjustice and home affairs, is commonly referred to as the "third pillar" of
the European Union. TEU, supra note 2, tit. VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 735-38; see Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution-The
Case of the European Union, 21 FoRDHA INT'L L.J. 746, 751 (1998).
5. SEA, supra note 2, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
6. TEU, supra note 2, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
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sterdam has confirmed, and in certain respects redefined the ex-
isting structures.
I think that the acid test of Amsterdam lies in whether it can
be operational enough to master the new economic and political
challenges of the European Union.
I would like to dwell, first of all, on the question of the insti-
tutional structure. One might say that the issues of the size of
the Commission and of the weighting of the votes in the Council
were not so important and that their resolution could be post-
poned. Messrs. Piris and Maganza take this view. But I would
beg to differ, agreeing with the Belgian, French, and Italian gov-
ernments, which issued a Declaration on this point.7 It was on
institutional reform that the IGC was meant to make progress in
order to create the conditions for enlargement. The Declara-
tion also makes clear that the capacity to decide on legislation
and other matters in an enlarged Union requires an extension
of qualified majority voting in the Council.
In a sense, Mr. Petite agrees with me. He states that quali-
fied majority voting' (or "QMV") becomes increasingly impor-
tant when the European Community (or "Community") grows
from fifteen to twenty to twenty-five Member States. It is already
proving impossible to decide through unanimity in a the Euro-
pean Union with fifteen countries; the chances of reaching una-
nimity with twenty, or twenty-two, or twenty-five are even more
remote. On this essential point the Amsterdam Treaty has failed
to facilitate the conditions for enlargement. Furthermore, the
future of the European Union itself is uncertain because any re-
vision of the treaties requires unanimity, and that essential point
has been maintained by both Maastricht and Amsterdam.
Not everything is gloomy, however, in the institutional field.
Indeed, the European Parliament's role, against all odds, has
been strengthened. This strengthening has not happened be-
cause the Member States were so interested in giving more
7. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, Declaration by Belgium, France and Italy
on the Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European
Union, O.J. C 340/1, at 144 (1997).
8. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
TEU, supra note 2 (setting forth weighted votes of Council for qualified majority); see
also GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrTY LAW
52-53 (1993).
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power to the Parliament, certainly not. It was because they all
had a bad conscience. Decision-making at the European level
must be subject to democratic control. As national parliamen-
tarians lose their grip on European legislation, the European
Parliament must be granted the right to exert that control. That
is basically the central question that the Amsterdam Treaty be-
gins to address. Mention must be made here of the two repre-
sentatives of the European Parliament-Elisabeth Guigou and
Elmar Brok-who participated in the IGC discussion and
thereby contributed to the significant strengthening of Europe's
only democratically-elected institution.
The one institution that, indeed, has come out better is the
European Parliament. When you legislate in the world of the
1990s, it is not possible to legislate without any parliamentary
involvement in Europe. That is basically the central question
that the new Treaty begins to address.
It is incredible that this point has been put off for so long.
The monopolistic legislative role of the Council of Ministers was
always an unnatural role. To a certain degree that has now been
corrected. A reliable estimate is that seventy-five percent of
Community legislation must be adopted through full co-decision
of the European Parliament and the Council when the Treaty of
Amsterdam enters into force.
But, let us not forget that the key area of agriculture, which
accounts for fifty percent of Community expenditure, has not
been democratized. The Parliament is only consulted on deci-
sions in this field. Let us not forget that on budgetary issues-
and we are talking about a Community budget of close to
US$100 billion-there has been no further improvement. The
division of budgetary powers between the Council and European
Parliament has remained the same. Also, in the area of commer-
cial policy, Article 113, an area so important for the orientation
of the international standing of the European Union, the Euro-
pean Parliament is not, in any formal sense, involved. So, there
are really quite a few areas where the democratic nature of this
European Union needs to be fully achieved, and on none of
these issues has any Member State made any serious effort to do
anything about it.
So, as an ongoing concern, developments for the worse
have been avoided. As to the future development we are in a
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standoff phase. It is too early to judge whether this Union can
cope with the enormous challenges ahead.
A second positive aspect, also in view of the future enlarge-
ment, is the insertion of the principles of human rights and de-
mocracy into the Treaty, together with an element of political
control.9 Of course, there was a concern that the prospective
new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe, which so re-
cently had come out of the darkness of Communism, might slide
back and it was therefore seen as important that the Community
institutions should, in such a situation, have some leverage. One
may remember that this was not the case in the 1960s and early-
1970s, when Greece, for instance, fell under a military dictator-
ship. The Member States had to resort to the Council of Europe
and the freezing of the Association Agreement in order to apply
pressure against Greece on the human rights front. There may
be some hypocrisy in the introduction of human rights into the
Treaty at present time, but I think, nevertheless, that such an
introduction is a positive point.
Thirdly, I very much agree with Mr. Petite's comments on
flexibility. Flexibility is to the Treaty of Amsterdam what sub-
sidiarity was to the Treaty of Maastricht. It is, of course, abso-
lutely necessary that in a European Union of more than twenty
Member States, more than four million square kilometers, and
500 million citizens, we find a new balance between dogmatic
uniformity on the one hand, and a danger of disintegration on
the other. The latter danger, as embodied in the desire of some
for a Europe d la carte, always looms around the corner, and I
compliment the authors of the Amsterdam Treaty for having
found imaginative solutions on this issue.
In the choice between Europe ti la carte, or a "multiple
speed Europe," or concentric circles, or giomitrie variable, all
these wonderful terms that only Continentals can devise, I think
that the concept of flexibility, or "closer cooperation,"' 0 has
9. SeeTreaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(8)-(9), O.J. C 340/1, at 8-9 (1997)
(amending art. F of TEU and inserting art. F.1 into TEU); Consolidated version of the
Treaty on European Union, arts. 6, 7, O.J. C 340/2, at 153-54 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67, 69
(not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU] (arts. F and F.1 of TEU), incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
articles of the TEU will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on
European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
10. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(12), O.J. C 340/1, at 22-23 (1997)
(inserting tit. Via, Provisions on closer cooperation, into TEU); Consolidated TEU,
1999] S89
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saved us. Flexibility, subject to the concrete conditions written
into the Amsterdam Treaty, allows a majority of Member States
to pursue further integration in a situation where not all Mem-
ber States wish to participate. In this respect, the opt-out of the
United Kingdom from the Social Protocol1 and the opt-outs of
the United Kingdom and Denmark from the third stage of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union 12 have been useful experiences. Ba-
sically, the current philosophy is that flexibility or closer cooper-
ation should be allowed, but only as an ultimum remedium and
subject to the condition that it respects the acquis communautaire.
The new flexibility provisions represent a potential model
for progress exclusively regulated in accordance with EC rules,
and they prohibit at the same time any fallback from the current
level of integration. I hope that this is the right interpretation
for the future. For the time being, on this point, I am really
pretty positive.
My fourth point concerns the free movement of persons.
That was, of course, a major challenge because not only did the
third pillar not work, but also we had this indeed opaque, as Mr.
Petite said, Schengen Agreement.1 3 Although the Protocols X,
supra note 9, tit. VII, O.J. C 340/2, at 169-70 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (tit. VIa of TEU);
Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 1(11), O.J. C 340/1, at 21-22 (1997) (inserting art.
K.12 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra, art. 40, O.J. C 340/2, at 167-68 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 76 (tit. K.12 of TEU); see also Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 2(5), O.J. C
340/1, at 25-26 (1997) (inserting art. 5a into Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity ("EC Treaty")); Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity, art. 11, O.J. C 340/3, at 184 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 81 (not yet ratified) [hereinaf-
ter Consolidated EC Treaty] (art. 5a of EC Treaty), incorporating changes made 6y Treaty
of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the EC Treaty
will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, OJ. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
11. TEU, supra note 2, Protocol on social policy, O.J. C 224/1, at 126-28 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 776-80. The Protocol on social policy is annexed to the EC Treaty.
Annexed to this protocol are an agreement on social policy and two declarations. See
TEU, supra, Agreement on Social Policy Concluded between the Member States of the
European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 776-80; id., Declaration on Article 2(2), [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 780; id., Declaration on Article 4(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 780.
12. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 109, O.J. C 224/1, at 37-38 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 643-44.
13. Schengen Agreement Between The Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of controls at the common frontiers, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68, 73
(1991).
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PERSPECTIVE
Y, and Z14 are not the most marvelous legal structures that I
could imagine, sooner or later, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
and Denmark will have to come to terms with the provisions for
the free movement of persons flowing from the Schengen Agree-
ment, which are to be incorporated in the Treaty. I think there-
fore that we should look at this point more as political scientists
than as lawyers.
The incorporation of the Schengen provisions in the
Treaty, which is still the subject of negotiations between the
Member States, is not going according to plan. Some Member
States would prefer to transfer the whole of Schengen to the
third pillar. This step would be harmful from an institutional
point of view because in that case the democratic and judicial
control by, respectively, the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, would not be guaranteed.
I offer an example: the Schengen information system.
Should it be financed by the Community budget? What will be
on the first pillar side? What will be on the third pillar side? We
here have a number of elements that still need to be untangled.
As a member of the Budget Committee, I can say that the
Budget Committee will be particularly anxious to have full con-
trol over the financing of the SIS, if it considers that the struc-
ture adopted is one that is not satisfactory.
My final point concerns the Economic and Monetary
Union. The point has been made by Mr. Maganza, quite rightly
I think, that the Stability Pact15 is one of the key points of Am-
14. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, Protocol on the application of certain as-
pects of Article 7a of the Treaty establishing the European Community to the United
Kingdom and to Ireland, 0.J. C 340/1, at 97-98 (1997) (formerly Protocol X in draft
Treaty of Amsterdam); id., Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ire-
land, O.J. C 340/1, at 99-100 (1997) (formerly Protocol Y in draft Treaty of Amster-
dam); id., Protocol on the position of Denmark, 0.J. C 340/1, at 101-02 (1997) (for-
merly Protocol Z in draft Treaty of Amsterdam).
15, Also known as the Stability and Growth Pact of June 1997, the Stability Pact is
composed of one political recommendation and two regulations. Council Recommen-
dation of 7July 1997 on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member
States and of the Community, 0.J. L 209/12 (1997); Council Regulation No. 1466/97
of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the
surveillance and coordination of economic policies, 0.J. L 209/1 (1997); Council Regu-
lation No. 1467/97 of 7July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of
the excessive deficit procedure, O.J. L 209/6 (1997); see RogerJ. Goebel, European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 310-13
(1998); see also Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, The Introduction of the Euro: Overview of the
Legal Framework and Selected Legal Issues, 4 COLUM. J. EUR.. L. 321, 330-31 (1998) (discuss-
19991
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sterdam, even though it is of course not part of the Amsterdam
Treaty. The Employment Chapter 6 was inserted into the Am-
sterdam Treaty as a major incentive in getting the new French
Government to accept the Amsterdam Treaty as a whole.
The one unresolved point, of course-and I come back to
the point of accountability-is to whom will the European Cen-
tral Bank be accountable? That is going to be a major political
debate. Independence is important. No one wants to under-
mine the role of the Central Bank, but this new European Cen-
tral Bank is much more independent even than the Federal Re-
serve or the Bundesbank. The European Parliament intends to
organize hearings on the first nominees, but this can only be
one part of the accountability question. We should all realize
that accountability is still a major political challenge.
To sum up, the European Union as an ongoing concern has
been safeguarded, and the first pillar, the European Commu-
nity, remains the key constituent element of that process. One
should not believe that the second and third pillars are of the
same value. But the new challenges shed a more doubtful light.
On Agenda 2000,"7 the future financing of the European Union,
the accession of ten new Member States, it is uncertain what will
happen. I recall that Queen Elizabeth stated that 1992 had been
an annus horribilis, referring of course to the divorce of Prince
Charles and Lady Princess Diana. I believe that the European
Union will go through three anni horribiles, because we are still
talking about the financing of the European Union with twenty-
five Member States, with no chance of having qualified majority
voting introduced on these kind of issues.
ing two components of Stability and Growth Pact). The European Council issued a
resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact that set forth firm commitments of the
Member States, the Commission, and the Council regarding the implementation of the
pact. See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact of 17
June 1997, Amsterdam, OJ. C 236/1 (1997).
16. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(19), O.J. C 340/1, at 33-35 (1997)
(inserting tit. VIa on Employment into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note
10, tit. VIII, O.J. C 340/3, at 235-36 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 107 (tit. VIa, arts. 109n-109s of
EC Treaty).
17. Commission of the European Communities, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and
Wider Union, COM (97) 2000 Final/i (July 1997); Commission of the European Com-
munities, Agenda 2000: The Challenge of Enlargement, COM (97) 2000 Final/2 (July
1997); see Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union (visited Aug. 23, 1998) <http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/overview/en/agenda.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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So the jury is still out, but I am comforted by the fact that we
have become a somewhat more democratic community. Be-
cause I have another chance to contribute, I will address that
issue in more detail later.18
18. Laurens Jans Brinkhorst, Transparency in the European Union, 22 FoR.Di M INT'L
L.J. 85 (1998).
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